Copyright without Copying by Mulligan, Christina




Copyright without Copying 
Christina Mulligan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty 





I. THE CURRENT COPYRIGHT REGIME ...................... 470
II. WHY PROTECT AN EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO Copy? ......... 479
III. REVISED RIGHTS & APPLICATIONS ....................... 482
A. Purchasing a Digital or Nondigital Work ............ 484
1. Model Regime, Traditional Media ............... 484
2. Model Regime, Digital Media .................. 485
B. Illegal Downloading ................................ 485
C. De M inimus Uses .................................. 486
D. Lending and Reselling .............................. 487
E. The Cloud ......................................... 488
F. Adverse Possession and Bad Title ................... 489
IV. TRANSITION TO THE REVISED REGIME .................... 490
A. Application to Existing Works ....................... 490
B. International Agreements ........................... 491
CONCLUSION ..................................................... 492
INTRODUCTION
Digital media and software have broken copyright law. Although a
consumer experiences the same work when reading a book printed on
paper or copied onto an e-reader, the applications of copyright law to
traditional and digital media usage have diverged dramatically because
digital works are frequently copied in the course of their use. Copyright
theorists have struggled with how to craft legal rules that would align
rights in traditional and digital works, frequently proposing new excep-
tions for digital uses or interpretations of fair use. But there is a more
elegant path forward, which has been too difficult to contemplate seri-
ously because the law that needs to be changed is synonymous with
copyright itself.
* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Peter DiCola, Rebecca
Eisenberg, Joe Fishman, Brad Greenberg, Paul Heald, Jay Kesan, Jessica Litman, Aaron
Perzanowski, Melissa Feeney Wasserman, the faculty at Brooklyn Law School and Case West-
ern Reserve University School of Law, the Spangenberg Center for Law, Technology & the
Arts, the members of the University of Illinois IP Colloquium, the University of Michigan IP
Colloquium, and attendees of IP Scholars Conference 2015.
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The reproduction right-the copy right-should be eliminated. His-
torically, the reproduction right functioned well to give copyright holders
control over their work and as a reasonable tool for determining how
much remuneration they were due. But now the reproduction right fails
as a proxy for value in the digital realm by overcounting copies that have
little relationship to the value created by authors.
This Essay makes the case for eliminating the reproduction right
entirely and for augmenting other exclusive authors' rights in exchange.
Although superficially radical, the elegant results of reform render the
suggestion worth contemplating. Moreover, despite the political in-
feasibility of reforming copyright in the immediate future, understanding
potential alternatives can prepare us to seize other opportunities for re-
form when they arise.
I. TiH CURRENT COPYRIGHT REGIME
The exclusive rights currently granted to copyright holders were
largely codified in section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act.1 These exclu-
sive rights include the rights to reproduce a copyrighted work, prepare
derivative works based upon a copyrighted work, distribute copies of a
work to the public, publicly display a work, and publicly perform a work
(excepting non-digital performances of sound recordings).
2
This Essay will leave to the side two significant aspects of copy-
right's exclusive rights regime because they are largely unrelated to the
subject at hand: the right to prepare derivative works,3 and the phenome-
non that non-digital performances of sound recordings are not part of the
bundle of exclusive copyright rights.
I Pub.L. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). The 1976 Act codified the rights contained in 17
U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5). The digital sound recording performance right was added by the Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub.L. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995).
2 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). Most precisely, the exclusive rights, subject to several
exceptions, consist of the rights to do and authorize the following activity:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
3 A derivative work is defined as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture ver-
sion, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
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These issues left to the side, we can summarize the remaining exclu-
sive rights as consisting of the right to reproduce, distribute, publicly
display, and publicly perform a copyrighted work. Notably, these exclu-
sive rights of copyright do not give the copyright holder complete control
over what can be done with the work.4 Private displays and performances
of a work are not covered, nor are uses of a work.5 For example, the
exclusive rights do not grant a copyright holder the right to insist that a
book buyer read a book in order, or only on Tuesdays, or only a certain
number of times.
Because of technical differences in how traditional and digital me-
dia are accessed, the Section 106 exclusive rights apply to traditional and
digital media in strikingly divergent ways. Consider, for example, printed
books and e-books.
In the case of a printed novel, the copyright holder will license a
printer to reproduce the book under Section 106(1) and distribute the
copies under Section 106(3). The first sale doctrine, currently codified in
Section 109(a), then provides that the purchaser of the books can redis-
tribute them without violating the copyright holder's exclusive rights.
6
Under the first sale doctrine, a person who purchases the book in a book-
store similarly has the right to resell or give away the book. Because the
other section 106 rights only protect particular public uses of the work-
the right to display and perform a work publicly-a purchaser who looks
at or reads aloud a book in her own home does not violate any other
exclusive copyright rights.7 Exceptions such as the fair use doctrine not-
4 Copyright protection "has never accorded the copyright owner complete control over
all possible uses of his work." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univ. City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
432 (1984).
5 Id. at 468.
6 Section 109(a) provides, "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner
of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by
such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord." 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2008).
7 The exclusive rights of copyright law include the rights to "display [a] copyrighted
work publicly," 17 U.S.C. § 106(5); and to "perform [a] copyrighted work publicly," 17
U.S.C. § 106(4), (6). The Copyright Act defines performing or displaying a work publicly as
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different
times.
17 U.S.C. § 101. Controversially, in 2009, executive director of the Author's Guild, Paul
Aiken, took the position that an Amazon Kindle that used a text-to-speech function to privately
read a book aloud would violate the derivative work copyright law if done without permission.
Geoffrey A. Fowler & Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, New Kindle Audio Feature Causes a Stir,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123419309890963869 ('"They
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withstanding,8 the purchaser cannot make additional reproductions of the
book by hand or using a copy machine.
Contrast this story with how a consumer acquires an e-book. In
practice, e-books are generally licensed, not sold, to readers, and the per-
mission readers have to access the e-book are governed by a detailed
license agreement, not a direct application of copyright law.9 In part,
licensing digital content has become omnipresent because courts are
willing to enforce license agreements for the use of digital media and
software,10 and companies find it attractive to delineate their rights, and
limit less-desirable users' rights, when they can.11 But more interest-
don't have the right to read a book out loud," said Paul Aiken, executive director of the Au-
thors Guild. "That's an audio right, which is derivative under copyright law"). Aiken's posi-
tion was criticized because, if taken as law, it would eliminate the public's ability to make
private displays and performances of a work without permission of the copyright holder, de-
spite the statute appearing to not grant private performance and display rights to copyright
holders. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, According to Author's Guild, You Cannot Read Books Out
Load, TECHIRT, Feb. 10, 2009, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090210/1014293724
.shtml ("Read to your kids at night? Watch out for the Authors Guild police banging down
your door").
8 Exceptions to the section 106 exclusive rights are set forth in sections 107 through 122
of title 17. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 ("Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following"). The
broadest of the exceptions to section 106, the fair use doctrine, is set forth in section 107.
Section 107 holds that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 ... the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright." When deciding whether a use of work falls under the fair use
doctrine, courts are instructed to look at four factors: "(1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work." There are far too many significant works explor-
ing the scope of the fair use doctrine to include in a single footnote, but those interested in
exploring the scope of the doctrine might read William W. Fisher 11, Reconstructing the Fair
Use Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1659 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Fail-
ure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamx Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM.
L. REv. 1600 (1982); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1105
(1990); Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REv. 685 (2015);
Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1525 (2004); L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, 55-SPG LAW & CONrEMP. PROBS.
249 (1992); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2537 (2009).
9 See, e.g., Kindle Store Terms of Use, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/dis-
play.html?nodeld=201014950 (last updated Oct. 5, 2016); Nook Store Terms of Service,
https://www.barnesandnoble.com/h/nook-store-terms-of-service (last updated Apr. 1, 2015).
10 Courts' willingness to enforce non-negotiated agreements has generally become very
permissive so long as the licenses' content is not unconscionable, is "reasonably expected," or
is "not radically unexpected." See MARGARET JANE RAD N, BOILERPLATE 82-86 (2014).
11 Courts tend to hold that licenses can completely change the contours of what end-
users are permitted to do with licensed works; for example, several courts have held that users
can waive their fair use rights by assenting to end-user license agreements. See, e.g., Bowers v.
Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (shrink-wrap license precludes
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ingly, licensing digital content has become de rigeuer because, under
current law, purchasing digital media without a license does not appear
to grant the purchaser any useful set of rights.
Consider if one "bought" an e-book in the form of a Portable Docu-
ment Format (PDF) file from an online store, without any additional li-
cense agreement. The purchaser's computer would download a copy,
making a reproduction with permission from the copyright holder under
section 106(1). But unlike in the case of the physical book, once a pur-
chaser tries to access and read the PDF file, the copyright holder's exclu-
sive rights are implicated again, under a prevailing interpretation of
copyright law. In a 1993 Ninth Circuit decision, MAI Systems Corp. v.
Peak Computer Inc., the court held that, because running a program cre-
ated a temporary copy in a computer's Random Access Memory (RAM),
running a software program constituted prima facie copyright infringe-
ment of a copyright owner's exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted
work. 12 Although the MAI Systems decision was controversial, two years
later President Bill Clinton's Working Group on Intellectual Property re-
leased a White Paper expressing the view that MAI Systems was a cor-
rectly decided and routine application of the law.13 The White Paper
concluded that any use of a digital work constituted a prima facie copy-
right infringement because any copy of a work loaded into a computer's
RAM constituted an actionable copy under the copyright statute.14 As a
result, the White Paper argued copyright owners had the right to control
whether and how someone read, listened to, or viewed a digital work,
even though the copyright statute did not allow copyright holders to exert
the same control over the use of non-digital works.15
Because a computer necessarily makes a copy of an e-book in RAM
when a PDF file is accessed, the RAM copy doctrine means that any use
reverse engineering of software); Davidson & Associates, Inc. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F.
Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004), affd, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005) (shrink-wrap license
waives reverse engineering fair-use right); Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Construction
Co., LLC, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (holding shrink-wrap license enforceable
and clause forbidding reverse engineering was not preempted by federal law); see also RAY-
MOND T. NIMEmR & JEFF C. DODD, MODERN LICENSING LAW § 9.31 (2014). For a more de-
tailed discussion of this phenomenon and its economic effects, see Guy A. Rub, Contracting
Around Copyright, The Uneasy Case for Unbundling of Rights in Creative Works, 78 CHI. L.
REv. 257 (2011).
12 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).
13 JESSICA LrrTMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 94-95 (2001).
14 See, e.g., Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the Na-
tional Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property
Rights 65-66 (1995) [hereinafter "White Paper"], available at https://catalog.hathitrust.org/
Record/003022963.
15 LrITAN, supra note 13, at 94-95 (citing White Paper, supra note 14, at 19-130).
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of a digital file can qualify as an infringing reproduction of the work.16
Although hotly contested, many now accept this position as the law. 17
Absurdly, it appears to follow from the RAM copy doctrine that, even if
one has legally "purchased" a copy of a digital e-book, one is legally
estopped from using it absent some additional permission or statutory
exemption that allows access to the work.18 As a result, end-user license
agreements to use digital copyrighted works proliferate, not only to re-
strict consumers' rights to access the work, but to give consumers the
necessary permissions to make practical use of the work.
The RAM copy doctrine remains controversial, particularly because
of the apparently absurd results that follow from it.19 Some argue that
MAI Systems and the RAM copy doctrine are simply wrong as a matter
of law and policy.2 0 Others suggest that consumers may have fair use
rights or an implied license to make copies necessary to use a lawfully-
16 LITMAN, supra note 13, at 92 ("For all works encoded in digital form, any act of
reading or viewing the work would require the use of a computer .... and would, under this
interpretation, involve an actionable reproduction."); id. at 95 ("[S]ince any use of a computer
to view, read, reread, hear, or otherwise experience a work in digital form would require
reproducing that work in a computer's memory, and since the copyright statute gives the copy-
right holder exclusive control over reproductions, everybody would need to have either a statu-
tory privilege or the copyright holder's permission to view, read, reread, hear, or otherwise
experience a digital work, each time she did so.").
17 See Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 Nw. U. L. Rav. 1067, 1070-71
(2010) (noting that, as the RAM copy doctrine "was embraced by a growing majority of
courts, Peak's critics took pains to detail its many flaws."); id. at 1073 ("[M]ost courts that
have applied Peak give its core holding a broader thrust ... opting instead for clarity and
simplicity. This hard RAM copy doctrine holds that all temporary digital instantiations of
copyrighted works are copies."). Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121
(2d Cir. 2008); has somewhat weakened the RAM copy doctrine by holding that a copy of a
work that existed for at most 1.2 seconds did not qualify as a reproduction of the work. How-
ever, in practice, Cartoon Network has not changed how parties treat software and digital
media files.
18 LITmAN, supra note 13, at 92; Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CAR-
Dozo ARTS & Errr. L.J. 29, 31-32 (1994).
19 As Mark Lemley observed:
If one accepts the argument that RAM copies are actionable under § 106(1), the
number of copies made in even the most routine Net transactions increases dramati-
cally. Obviously, each act of uploading or downloading makes a RAM copy in the
recipient's computer, but that is only the beginning. When a picture is downloaded
from a Web site, the modem at each end will buffer each byte, as will the router, the
receiving computer, the Web browser, the video decompression chip, and the video
display board. Those seven copies will be made on each such transaction.
Mark Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV.
547, 554-55 (1997).
20 See James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person's Guide, 10
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 47, 90 (1996) ("Even if information in RAM can be considered a copy, it
is not a harmful copy and should not be deemed infringing."); see also Perzanowski, supra
note 17.
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acquired file.21 Still others are not particularly concerned with the RAM
copy doctrine because they are comfortable with using end-user license
agreements to delineate consumer's rights.22 Purchased software avoids
some of the absurdity of the RAM copy doctrine due to a separate sec-
tion of the Copyright Act which lets one make copies of sold, but not
licensed, software necessary for its use.
23
A similar divergence in the law's application to traditional and digi-
tal media appears when one wants to move a work from one location to
another. Carrying a physical book from one location to another impli-
cates no copyright issues, and transferring it to another owner is covered
by the first sale doctrine.2 4 Similarly, transferring a hard drive that con-
tains a purchased e-book to a different location or owner implicates no
more legal issues than the RAM copy doctrine described above.25 How-
ever, it is far more typical for users who consume digital media to want
to access their files from a number of different devices. Copying an e-
book onto an e-reader or general purpose tablet reproduces the file. The
law doesn't need a contestable legal opinion like MAI Systems to find
that copying the file onto a tablet creates a prima facie infringing copy of
21 See Lemley, supra note 19, at 567 (suggesting that implied license provides a defense
to infringing copyright with RAM copies, but it does so "precisely . . . where . . . least
needed"); Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1871 (2007); Jule L. Sigall,
Copyright Infringement Was Never This Easy: RAM Copies and Their Impact on the Scope of
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 181, 217-19 (1995) (ar-
guing that RAM copies should be considered fair uses).
22 See, e.g., Irna D. Manta & David S. Olson, Hello Barbie: First They Will Monitor
You, Then They Will Discriminate Against You. Perfectly., 67 AI. L. REv. 135, 136 (2015).
23 Although 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) permits an "owner of a copy of a computer program
to make... another copy... of that computer program provided... that such a new copy...
is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine and that it is used in no other manner." 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (1998). This "essential
step" exception does not apply to copying software that has been licensed but not sold, or to
other types of digital media. See Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control
Copy Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887, 1889
(2010) ("[O]nly those who are 'owners' of a copy are entitled to exercise the important rights
of 17 U.S.C. § 109 and § 117, the first sale rights, and the right to make essential-step copies
and adaptations of computer programs, respectively.").
24 "[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord ... is entitled, without the authority
of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or pho-
norecord." 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2008).
25 "Section 109(a) ... protects a lawful owner's sale of her 'particular' phonorecord, be
it a computer hard disk, iPod, or other memory device onto which the file was originally
downloaded. While this limitation clearly presents obstacles to resale that are different from,
and perhaps even more onerous than, those involved in the resale of CDs and cassettes, the
limitation is hardly absurd-the first sale doctrine was enacted in a world where the ease and
speed of data transfer could not have been imagined." Capitol Records LLC v. ReDigi Inc.,
934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
2017]
476 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 27:469
the work; it is legally indisputable that there is a reproduction.26 While
one needs no permission to carry a book from home to read it on the
subway, copying a PDF file onto a tablet to read on-the-go requires the
permission of the copyright holder or needs to fall under an exception to
the exclusive rights.
Although this result is legally uncontroversial, many resist the idea
that moving digital works between devices (and even to a new computer
when the old one breaks) for personal use is something that a copyright
holder should be able to forbid. Most commonly, commentators argue
that personal and incidental uses of a work should qualify as fair use, or
that "space shifting" is fair use.2 7 Indeed, a Ninth Circuit case, RAA v.
Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., stated in dicta that space shifting quali-
fies as a fair use.2 8 But holdings in space-shifting cases turn on fine
points that don't necessarily map to intuitions or common sense. While
one can probably rip one's own CD on to one's hard drive, another cir-
cuit court decision held that one couldn't gain access to streaming music
over the Internet by proving that one had a legal copy of the CD.2 9 The
law of space shifting is unsettled, although it mostly remains so because
digital media sellers have not been inclined to litigate the position that
space shifting to make personal uses is illegal.30 As a result, many indi-
viduals use copyrighted digital works in what amounts to a "grey" copy-
right regime, in which consumers follow their own rule of thumb ("I paid
for it and therefore should be able to use it") that roughly reflects their
intuitions about property rights and what the copyright holder or creator
of the work deserves.
26 Cf Boyle, supra note 20, at 90 ("Unlike information in Read Only Memory (ROM) or
magnetic storage, information in RAM is volatile; it is constantly rewritten while the computer
is being used and cannot survive the loss of power to the computer.").
27 The idea of "space shifting" is a tiff on the notion of "time shifting" held to be fair use
in Sony v. Universal City Studios. See RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating in dicta that a digital music player "makes copies in order
to render portable, or 'space-shift,' those files that already reside on a user's hard drive....
Such copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the pur-
poses of the Act.") (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455
(1984)); cf Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 455 (holding that "time shifting" of copyrighted television
shows with VCRs constitutes fair use under the Copyright Act, and thus is not an infringe-
ment). Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz argue for a similar result based on applying the
doctrine of exhaustion in a digital context. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Copyright
Exhaustion and the Personal Use Dilemma, 96 MiNN. L. REv. 2067, 2136-38 (2012).
28 RLAA v. Diamond, 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating in dicta that a digital
music player "makes copies in order to render portable, or 'space-shift,' those files that already
reside on a user's hard drive .... Such copying is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use
entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act.").
29 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351-53 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
30 Cf Fred Von Lohmann, RIAA Says Ripping CDs to Your iPod is Not Fair Use, Euic-
TROmiC FRONTIER FOUNDATION DEEPLINKS (Feb. 15, 2006), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2006/02/riaa-says-ripping-cds-your-ipod-not-fair-use.
COPYRIGHT WITHOUT COPYING
The application of copyright law to digital works presents a problem
for critics of end-user license agreements and for those who would prefer
a regime where private uses of physical and digital media had a more
similar legal character. Yet, it is difficult to imagine how copyright law,
as currently codified, could be bent to create the same results in physical
and digital circumstances. Physical copies of media are treated almost
identically to personal property; when one legally acquires a physical
book, one effectively gains the rights to make personal uses of it and to
alienate the copy. But the analogy to a piece of property fails in a digital
context; many uses of the digital file create additional copies, even if the
consumer only accesses one at a time. There is no single piece of physi-
cal property to hold rights over. Licenses conceal the problem by grant-
ing users rights that make the works usable, such as "personal use rights"
or the right to use the work on a certain number of devices, but they
generally don't create a legal regime that exactly parallels the rights one
gains when buying physical copies.
As a result, while critiques of end-user licensing agreements are
common, articulating alternatives to the widespread use of license agree-
ments is a challenge.3' Some have advocated for a "digital first sale"
doctrine that permits one to sell a file and move it to a new storage
device, so long as one deletes the original file at the same time the new
file is being created, or immediately after,32 although a district court re-
jected the argument that this practice was legal in the 2013 Capitol
Records v. ReDigi decision.33 By focusing on the conservation of copies,
proposals for a digital first sale doctrine allow for the digital environment
to mirror the physical one. We can pretend that the digital copy moved
from one location to another, instead of recognizing that what really hap-
pened was that a second copy was made and the first copy destroyed.
31 As this Author has discussed elsewhere, the idiosyncrasy of digital licenses increases
transaction and measurement costs of using digital property, leading to mistaken over- and
under-use of the files and confusion about what one can do with digital content. See generally
Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property, 80 TENN. L. REv.
235 (2013); Christina Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes on the Internet of Things, 50
GA. L. REv. 1121 (2016); see also Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion,
58 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 889, 891, 901-02 (2011) (criticizing the use of EULAs and advocating
for the development of a digital first sale doctrine). Moreover, licensing culture facilitates the
waiver of other legal rights. See generally RAmJn, supra note 10.
32 See Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1997);
Victor F. Calaba, Quibbles 'N Bits: Making A Digital First Sale Doctrine Feasible, 9 MiCH.
TELECOMM. & TacH. L. Rev. 1, 27-30 (2002) (describing the "simultaneous destruction" pro-
posal); Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations (BAL-
ANCE) Act, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003); Henry Sprott Long 1H, Reconsidering the
"Balance" of the "Digital First Sale" Debate: Re-Examining the Case for a Statutory Digital
First Sale Doctrine to Facilitate Second-Hand Digital Media Markets, 59 ALA. L. Rev. 1183,
1194-98 (2008) (describing the suggestion of "forwarding and deleting" digital content).
33 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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The notion of "conservation of copies" may be initially appealing,
but it unnecessarily requires the deletion of potentially useful informa-
tion and back-up copies. For example, suppose that in the interest of
conserving copies, someone deletes an e-book file from his home com-
puter's hard drive when copying the file to his tablet. Deleting the file
from the hard drive has no practical effect if no one else would have
accessed the e-book on the home computer while its owner was at work.
But keeping exactly one digital copy has the potential to create more
unexpected difficulties for an owner than keeping one physical copy.
Digital storage devices don't show wear-and-tear the same way a paper
book does. In a world where we obsess over conservation of copies, a
commuter could find her tablet abruptly and unexpectedly breaks, and
that she has lost her only copy of a work (which may or may not be
available to purchase again). Given the fragility of devices and the fact
that their imminent failure is not always externally visible, forcing con-
sumers to delete back-up copies in order to emulate a non-digital legal
regime needlessly makes it easier for information to be lost or destroyed.
Conservation of copies may have the appealing effect of creating sym-
metry in the application of copyright law to physical and digital copies,
but it removes a beneficial feature of computing technology: storage is
inexpensive, and as is frequently noted for important files, "lots of copies
keep stuff safe."'
34
The idea of conserving digital copies has not been embraced by
courts.35 But without it, the only alternative to avoid needing to license
all digital content is to cobble together exceptions and rights from the fair
use doctrine, notions of implied license, and the elimination of the RAM
copy doctrine.
36
There is, however, another path forward. The reproduction right cre-
ates unintended and undesirable results in a digital context. It is worth
considering whether copyright law could still function, and provide the
same protection it does to creators and copyright holders, with a set of
protections that entirely omits the reproduction right.
34 See Preservation Principles, LOCKSS.ORG, http://www.lockss.org/about/principles/ (last
visiting Sept. 27, 2015).
35 See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 648 (noting "courts have not previously addressed
whether the unauthorized transfer of a digital music file over the Internet-where only one file
exists before and after the transfer--constitutes reproduction within the meaning of the Copy-
right Act" and concluding that "th[is] Court holds that it does.").
36 Cf Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 27, at 2070 ("Courts and commentators have
generally taken one of three approaches to justify personal uses: narrow interpretations of
exclusive rights, fair use, and implied license. While each approach can resolve some aspects
of the personal use dilemma, none are able to provide fully satisfying rationales or coherent
doctrinal rules, and all three are limited in important respects and potentially vulnerable to
erosion in the long tenn."); See generally Perzanowski, supra note 20.
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1. WHY PROTECT AN EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO COPY?
Why does the law confer an exclusive right to reproduce a copy-
righted work in the first place? The centrality of the reproduction right to
copyright jurisprudence makes this question initially seem bizarre.37 But
the particular rights granted to copyright holders are not divinely in-
spired; their moral character is not deduced from reason alone. Even if
one believes that there is a moral or practical need for the government to
enforce the protection of exclusive rights in intellectual works, it does
not necessarily follow that the proper set of rights to enforce are repro-
duction, distribution, public display, and public performance. Many plau-
sible rights are absent from this list: the rights to use publicly or
privately, to display privately, to perform privately, to acquire, and to
passively possess.
The choice to protect certain rights instead of others is motivated by
both practicality-what is enforceable and politically feasible-and by
the purposes of copyright law. But neither practical nor philosophical
concerns necessitate the existence of a reproduction right.
Philosophically, intellectual property laws are typically justified by
Locke's labor-desert theory,38 utilitarianism,
39 or personality theory.40
From the perspective of the goals of authors and copyright holders (as
contrasted with the public's interest), these theories animate copyright
holders' efforts to secure legal rights which help them achieve two over-
lapping ends: capturing economic value from their works, and exerting
control over how their works are used and experienced, even if the con-
trol does not create economic benefit for the author. Eliminating the re-
production right need not prejudice the copyright holder's efforts to
achieve either aim.
Consider the copyright holder's goal of monetizing works, most
closely associated with the utilitarian justifications of copyright law. For
the utilitarian, copyright law achieves its ends when authors earn or have
the prospect of earning enough wealth from their creations (for various
37 Indeed, William Patry and Richard Posner once remarked that "a right to unlimited
copying of an expressive work without the authorization of the copyright owner.., would be
the undoing of copyright." William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory
Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1639, 1644 (2004).
38 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Indi-
vidualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1556-57 (1993);
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296-98 (1988).
39 E.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. Rev. 485, 533
(2004) ("American copyright law has been set on a utilitarian foundation... [that] constructs
copyright as a creature of positive law, by which exclusive rights . . . may be offered, or
withheld, on whatever basis is rationally calculated to benefit the public."); Sara K. Stadler,
Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REv. 609, 670-71 (2006).
40 E.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 959
(1982); see also Hughes, supra note 38, at 330.
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interpretations of "enough") to motivate their creative work.41 Because
their goal is utility-increasing creative output rather than protection of
rights, many utilitarians would be equally pleased if, instead of there be-
ing intellectual property protection that transferred wealth from consum-
ers or creators, the government simply funded artists through prizes,
grants, tax incentives, or other means. But historically, protecting a right
to reproduce a copyrighted work was a decent, practical tool to achieve
wealth transfer to creators and copyright holders. Prior to the advent of
home computers, acts of reproduction were fairly visible-on a large
scale, one historically needed large amounts of equipment to make repro-
ductions, whether that equipment consisted of a printing press or a ga-
rage full of VCRs. Indeed, before July 8, 1870, American copyright
holders only enjoyed the exclusive rights of "printing, reprinting, pub-
lishing, and vending" works.42 Because of the fairly public and central
nature of acts of printing, focusing on when reproductions occurred was
a practical option for approximating when the copyright holder should be
compensated for their work.
From a practical perspective, this is no longer true. Reproductions
occur on home computers, in private, sometimes even without the knowl-
edge of a computer user (for example, when a copy is made in RAM or is
backed up by an automated process). Reproductions are not only fre-
quently invisible, but they also no longer correspond to moments where
value is created for the consuming public. As Sara Stadler argued in an
earlier work calling for the end of the reproduction right, "the problem is
not one of reproduction, but rather of distribution. '43 The creation of a
reproduction indicates little. However, the distribution of work, and the
experience of a work, are moments where an author's work affects com-
merce and consumer. If we want copyright law to reward authors for the
impact they can have on the world, the exclusive right to reproduction
fails to do this.
But perhaps, instead, one is more concerned with copyright holders'
having the right kind of control over their work. For the Lockeans, copy-
right law should protect the natural rights that one has over one's prop-
erty.44 Similarly, for the personality theorists, a significant purpose of
copyright law is to preserve or create the right kind of relationship with
41 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property Law, 98 VA. L.
REv. 1745, 1751 (2012); Stadler, supra note 39, at 611.
42 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (2d Sess.); Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch.
36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (1st Sess.); Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (2d
Sess.).
43 Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 944-45
(2007).
44 See generally Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN Dmio L. REv. 29
(2005).
COPYRIGHT WITHOUT COPYING
one's property.45 Under these theories, property holders need not provide
an economic justification for their choices. The copyright holder may
typically refuse to deal with those who want to use their works in partic-
ular ways, even if the copyright holder would be significantly financially
rewarded by the arrangement. Here again, the reproduction right only
roughly effectuates copyright holders' desire for control over their
works. Even in combination with the distribution, public display, and
public performance rights, most private activities remain outside the le-
gal reach of a copyright holder. The right to exclusively control repro-
ductions only imperfectly tracks a copyright holder's desire to control
how their work is used generally.
In short, while the reproduction right has been historically central to
copyright law, it need not remain so. Different combinations of rights
could yield the same degree of authorial control the law provides today,
as well as the same amount of compensation for authors. Moreover, a
legal regime that focuses on compensating authors based on the distribu-
tion or consumption of a work may create a closer nexus between the
compensation an author receives and the value the author creates.
Any consequentialist account of copyright law must also consider
the effect of the law on the non-creating public; indeed, the Constitution
vests Congress with the power to create copyrights and patents "to pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts,"46 a purpose which speaks
to benefits for not only authors and inventors, but for the public in gen-
eral. Here again, there is reason to question whether the reproduction
right has outlived its usefulness to the public. Not only do acts of repro-
duction fail to map to moments where value is created for consumers, but
in a digital context, the reproduction right is unintuitive and confusing.
The prohibition on making additional physical copies of works is
straightforward. But for a typical consumer of digital works, the notion
that one must have specific permission to make any use of a work, be-
cause most uses require reproduction, is poorly understood.
The existence of copyright law may be supported in a variety of
ways: by natural rights, utilitarianism, or personality theory, by a concern
for the well-being of authors, by a desire to increase the public's knowl-
edge, by a combination of several of these justifications. But just because
a system of exclusive rights for authors is warranted, that does not neces-
sarily mean that the reproduction right is. In the following section, this
Essay will explain how removing the reproduction right can lead to a
better copyright regime overall, for both authors and the public.
45 See Hughes, supra note 38, at 329 (arguing intellectual property "need[s] the support
of a personality theory, such as the one proposed by Hegel, in which property is justified as an
expression of the self').
46 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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El. REVISED RIGHTS & APPLICATIONS
In a digital context, the reproduction right creates an unintuitive
mess. Attempts to correct it under existing law are similarly ad hoc. This
is a shame because law, particularly law that affects individuals in fre-
quently-encountered situations, functions best when it is roughly under-
standable by the parties it affects. In the digital age, copyright law affects
everyone, and so copyright law must work for everyone.
A revision to copyright law that eliminates the reproduction right
would ideally have four qualities: elegance, symmetry, intuitiveness, and
conservation of authorial power. Elegance is used in the mathematical
sense: having the qualities of "neatness" and "simplicity. '47 A proposed
change should also create symmetry between how similar acts in a digital
and non-digital environment are treated under the law. The law should be
relatively intuitive for individuals who interact with copyrighted works
on a regular basis-indeed, for most of the population. Dozens of rules
and exceptions, whether in a statute or a license agreement, will typically
not be intuitive, and therefore not be followed correctly. Finally, a propo-
sal to create a more elegant copyright law should at least have the poten-
tial to conserve the same balance of power between author's rights and
public access to creative works. The purpose of conservation is more
political and practical than aspirational: the goal of this Essay is to argue
that the legal treatment of digital and nondigital works can be aligned
easily and intuitively, and that the public will be better served by a law
that treats digital and nondigital works the same. This alignment can be
achieved without taking a maximalist or minimalist position on the scope
of copyright law-indeed, there are ways to eliminate the reproduction
right that would grant greater or lesser rights to copyright holders than
they have today. This Essay aims to set aside the question of the proper
scope of copyright, with the hope that most answers to that question can
be accommodated herein.
47 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elegance (last vis-
ited Feb. 28, 2016).
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Current Section 106
Subject to [several exceptions], the owner
of copyright under this title has the exclu-
sive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies or phonorecords; [...]
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dra-
matic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dra-
matic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work,
to display the copyrighted work publicly;
and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to per-
form the copyrighted work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission.
48
Current Section 109(a)
Notwithstanding the provisions of section
106(3), the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title,
or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copy-
right owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of




Subject to [several exceptions], the owner
of copyright under this title has the exclu-
sive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to distribute copies or phonorecords of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending;
(2) in the case of [selected types of works]
to perform the copyrighted work publicly,
or from a copy;
49
(3) in the case of literary, musical, dra-
matic, and choreographic works, panto-
mimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work,
to display the copyrighted work.
Model Section 109(a)
Notwithstanding the provisions of section
106, the owner of a particular copy or pho-
norecord lawfully distributed under this
title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of
the copyright owner,
(1) to sell or otherwise transfer, indivisi-
bly, the possession of a copy of the work or
phonorecord and all rights granted to the
owner under this section;
(2) to privately perform the copyrighted
work;
(3) to privately display the copyrighted
work.
A private performance or display is any
performance or display that is not public,
under section 101.
This revision of the core exclusive rights has the primary effect of
making the plethora of digital copies irrelevant to the question of copy-
right, while preserving roughly the same degree of control and ability to
monetize work that copyright holders currently have. While eliminating
48 17 U.S.C. 106 (2002).
49 This phrasing is intended to exempt nonpublic performances of a work from memory
- i.e. not "from a copy" - from a copyright holder's exclusive control.
50 17 U.S.C. 109(a) (2008).
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the reproduction right, it also creates transferable private rights of display
and performance, which a purchaser gains when they acquire a copy of
the work which has been lawfully distributed.5 1 Lawful distributions oc-
cur with permission of the copyright holder, under the first sale doctrine
as codified in Model Section 109, or where another exception to the sec-
tion 106 rights is operating. Note that once the owner of a particular copy
exercises their right to sell or transfer a copy under Model Section
109(a), they lose all rights to perform or display copies of the work, or to
transfer other copies of the work with good title.
The remainder of this section will walk through the effect of the law
in a variety of situations under the new and old regimes.
A. Purchasing a Digital or Nondigital Work
1. Model Regime, Traditional Media
A printer prints copies of a novel and is licensed by the copyright
holder to distribute the books. Under Model Section 106(1), the printer
can only distribute copies of the book to a bookstore or wholesaler with
permission of the copyright holder. However, if the printer made copies
without permission, never distributed them, and merely kept them stored
somewhere, Model Section 106 would not be implicated.
If the printer sells the books to a bookstore, the bookstore can rely
on the benefits of Model Section 109 because the printer had permission
from the copyright holder to distribute the books. Under Model Section
109, the bookstore then gains the right to distribute the copies of the
book it has acquired from the printer.
When a customer purchases the book from the bookstore, they also
gain the full set of rights listed under Model Section 109, which the
bookstore correspondingly loses: the right to alienate a copy and to pri-
vately perform and display the work. The customer can use the book as
she pleases, and even make copies of the book on a photocopy machine.
However, exceptions such as the fair use doctrine notwithstanding, she
can only alienate one copy of the book. Once that copy is alienated, she
would no longer have the right to display its text (including by reading
the book herself) or to transfer any remaining copies she had. Any addi-
tional copies she had made would be stored or destroyed. If for some
reason the purchaser re-acquired the book through a legal distribution,
51 In an earlier work, Sara K. Stadler argued for the elimination of the reproduction right,
but did not advocate for the creation of additional exclusive rights for the copyright holder. See
Stadler, supra note 43, at 928 ("Accordingly, I argue that copyright owners should not enjoy
the reproduction right, but instead should enjoy only the exclusive right of public distribu-
tion"). Stadler took the position that "creators are not entitled to expect the right to exclude
others from engaging in acts of private copying . . . which, standing alone, do not serve as
market substitutes to any significant extent." Id. at 899.
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she would have regained the rights to privately display and perform the
copyrighted work, and be able to use the copies in her home for most
personal uses.
2. Model Regime, Digital Media
Suppose an online e-book seller such as amazon.corn sells (and does
not license) an e-book version of a novel, without protecting it with any
digital rights management ools. The seller has a license from the copy-
right holder to distribute copies of the work, and a purchaser downloads
the e-book from the seller. Because the e-book was distributed legally,
under Model Section 109 the purchaser gains the rights to display and
perform the work privately, as well as the right to alienate her rights to
display and perform the work.
Here, the purchaser is likely to make several copies of the work: in
her computer's RAM, on her tablet or e-reader, and on her phone. Per-
haps she uploads it to a cloud storage locker like Google Drive or Ama-
zon Cloud so she can access it on other computers, such as a computer at
her workplace. Because there is no reproduction right in the model re-
gime, none of these copies will implicate copyright law. It is only when
she displays the work on her monitor or screen (or, in the case of an
audio file, plays or performs the song) that copyright is implicated. Be-
cause she acquired a copy in a legal distribution, the purchaser has the
right to display the book on any of her devices.
If the purchaser decides she no longer wants the e-book, under
Model Section 109(a)(1), she can choose to transfer her interests to an-
other person. Suppose she emails a friend writing, "I already read this
book and don't think I'll read it again-you can have it," and attaches
the file to the email. Because she has transferred her Section 109 rights in
the book, she no longer has the right to display it (and therefore, to read
it), nor can she legally distribute a copy to another person. It's quite
likely that she accidentally kept a copy of the book on a flash drive or a
tablet, but passively keeping a copy, or even accidentally making more
copies if she backs up her entire hard drive, for instance, does not impli-
cate the proposed legal regime. As there is no reproduction right, making
extra copies-which provide no value to the user so long as they aren't
opened-is not copyright infringement under the model statute.
B. Illegal Downloading
In order to be politically viable, any revision to the copyright statute
would likely have to maintain the illegality of downloading content with-
out permission of the copyright holder. This revision does so for both the
distributor and, when the work is read or played, for the downloader.
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Consider the person who is in a position to make a file available to
be downloaded through a file sharing program. Currently, courts vary in
their interpretations of the distribution right. Some courts have held that
the person who makes a work available to others, such as by putting a
file in a "share" folder, is violating the existing Section 106(3) right to
distribute copies of the work.52 Others have held that one who makes
material available to others is not distributing the work.53 The Model
Sections 106 and 109 use the same "distribution" language as the ex-
isting statute. However the split resolves, the prevailing interpretation
would apply equally under current law and under Model Sections 106
and 109. If making a work available in a share folder does qualify as
distribution, then the party who has placed the media file in a share
folder would be liable for distributing a copyrighted work to everyone
after the first downloader. And even if the first downloader did receive a
legal transfer, the sharer would then lose his ability to legally display or
perform the work.
The downloader would not be liable for initially downloading a
copy of a media file again due to the lack of a reproduction right. How-
ever, when the downloader listened to ("performed") or read ("dis-
played") a file, then Model Section 106 would be implicated. Because
the downloader did not acquire a copy of the work that was "lawfully
distributed," she does not gain any of the rights specified in Model Sec-
tion 109. As a result, any attempt to make a consumptive use of the file
would mean that the downloader had prima facie violated the copyright
statute.
C. De Minimus Uses
Violations of the copyright statute that are considered de minimus
are not infringing.54 This rule is well positioned to provide for a key
behavior in the digital realm-checking a file to see what it is. The act of
looking at a copy, and displaying or performing a brief part of it in order
to recognize it, should not count as a violation of copyright.
52 See, e.g., Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2013); A&M Records v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153
(D. Mass. 2008); Universal City Studios Productions LLLP v. Bigwood, 441 F. Supp. 2d 185
(D. Me. 2006); Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
53 See, e.g., Nat'l Car Rental Sys. v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th Cir.
1993); Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Ariz. 2008); Obolensky v.
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 628 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
54 See, e.g., Castle Rock Ent., Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137-38 (2d
Cir. 1998) (noting that copying must be "more than 'de minimis'" to be infringing).
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D. Lending and Reselling
The Model Sections 106 and 109 effectively create a "first sale doc-
trine" for digital works, and although the change in exclusive rights ren-
ders the structure of the law very different than most existing "digital
first sale" proposals, the model sections carry the same two effects that
worry many creators: the possibility of close-in-time lending destroying
the market for new sales, and the possibility that parties will lie about
whether they have sold their interests in particular copies in order to "re-
sell" them repeatedly.
Neither of these concerns need present a problem for revising sec-
tions 106 and 109. The "problem" of lending is a particularly vexing one
philosophically. On the one hand, if we value physical libraries, it would
seem that policymakers should support digital lending libraries as well:
they would make more materials available to more people more effi-
ciently, improving the public's access to knowledge. On the other hand,
one might worry that "too much" lending could limit creators' ability to
monetize their works. We can easily imagine how: someone designs a
system to "rent" mp3s for exactly five minutes, and as a result twelve
people can rent the song per hour, 288 people per day, each by borrow-
ing and returning the song in a miniscule amount of time.
To the extent those who are concerned about digital lending would
worry that revised sections 106 and 109 would open the door to "too
much" sharing, the existing copyright statute already illustrates how dif-
ferent policy choices about lending can be made while preserving a ro-
bust first sale doctrine. The changes proposed here could be modified to
embrace or reject digital lending, by taking a cue from existing section
109(b)(1)(A).
55
In its current form, section 109(b) limits the first sale doctrine by
stating that owners of particular copies of sound recordings and computer
programs cannot rent them without permission of the copyright holder.
56
The section also limits the limitation: nonprofit libraries and schools can
rent sound recordings, although commercial ventures still cannot.57 Nota-
bly absent from section 109(b) is a limitation on renting audiovisual
55 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2012). Currently, section 109(b)(1)(A) reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), unless authorized by the owners of [the rele-
vant] copyright... neither the owner of a particular phonorecord nor any person in possession
of a particular copy of a computer program . . . may, for the purposes of direct or indirect
commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the possession of that pho-
norecord or computer program ... by rental, lease, or lending, or by any other act or practice
in the nature of rental, lease, or lending. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall apply to the
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works, which is why in the 1980s and 1990s there were so many video
rental stores.
Just as section 109(b) currently allows for some but not all instances
of lending lawfully-acquired works, sections 106 and 109 could be re-
vised to omit the reproduction right while still preserving a copyright
holder's control over commercial lending of digital works. A pro-lending
policy would list very few, if any, categories of work or lender in section
109(b); an anti-lending policy could list many more varieties. Parties
with diverging visions of the scope of intellectual property protections
will have different preferred outcomes, but both a "minimalist" and
"maximalist" vision remain compatible with removing the reproduction
right.
False resale is potentially more challenging because it is harder to
identify "pirated" digital goods, but the potential harm is also less signifi-
cant than one might expect. The primary concern is quite specific: a
commercial venture like ReDigi whose business model is facilitating dig-
ital resale between seller and buyer.58 Parties who are inclined to ille-
gally acquire media won't be attracted to such ventures as buyers, but
potential sellers might be inclined to pretend to sell the same work multi-
ple times. Any company in the intermediary position could take mea-
sures to make repeated "sales" more trouble than they are worth-most
easily, by disallowing the same account from selling the same piece of
media twice, and requiring accounts to be tied to particular bank ac-
counts or credit cards. Failure to do so while taking a cut of sales could
subject intermediaries to secondary liability. Moreover, given the grow-
ing popularity of on-demand streaming services like Spotify and, now,
Apple Music, the potential commercial market for second-hand digital
media seems like it may not be sizable enough to have a significant ef-
fect on copyright holders' ability to monetize their work, compared to the
negative effects of illegal downloading and sharing, and the benefits of
royalties from streaming services and new sales. Here, again, however,
small legislative fixes could be written to sidestep the problem. For ex-
ample, commercial intermediaries could be required to have a copyright
holders' permission before facilitating second-hand sales, while preserv-
ing digital media owners' legal right to transfer their files to friends and
heirs.
E. The Cloud
Revised sections 106 and 109 would also eliminate many of the
legal concerns surrounding cloud storage systems like Amazon Cloud
and Google Drive. Under the revised sections 106 and 109, any copies of
58 See Capitol Records LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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the work in the cloud storage system would be not infringing, because
there would be no reproduction right.
The question over which party to a transmission engages in a per-
formance following Am. Broadcasting Co. v. Aereo, Inc.
59 would remain
open under the model statutes. If Amazon were considered to be making
performances of the work, then cloud storage streaming systems would
probably be infringing. But if, as would follow from the pre-Aereo case
law,60 the performer would be considered the user or the person who
uploaded or placed the file into storage, no exclusive rights would be
violated. Having acquired the file in a legal distribution, the user would
be able to make private performances and displays of the work regardless
of device, and so re-accessing a file put into cloud storage would not be a
copyright infringement.
F. Adverse Possession and Bad Title
Even the most well-meaning person has borrowed a book or DVD
from a friend or taken one from a roommate and forgotten to return it.
Under current law, this phenomenon generally raises no copyright issues:
acts of private consumption do not implicate the section 106 rights. How-
ever, under the Model Sections 106 and 109, the private display or per-
formance of a work one did not acquire in a legal distribution would be a
violation of the statute. In principle, this reform is meant to prevent the
use of illegally downloaded works. However, it would also create copy-
right liability for reading a physical book or playing a record that be-
longed to a friend without that friend's permission. Copyright law's
statutory damages provisions permit copyright holders to demand up to
$30,000 for each infringed work, and up to $150,000 if the infringement
was willful. 61 If private display or performance qualifies as an infringe-
ment, the application of statutory damages to an illegal use of a work
could be manifestly unjust (though notably, under current law, the same
potential application of statutory damages to infringing uses and repro-
ductions of digital works already exists).
At present, the size of statutory damages is unmoored from the de-
gree of harm incurred by the copyright holder from an infringing per-
sonal use.62 If copyright remedies were proportional to the harm felt or
loss incurred by a copyright holder, there would be less concern over the
expansion of exclusive rights into the private sphere.
59 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
60 See, e.g., Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
61 17 U.S.C.§ 504(c)(1), (2) (2012).
62 Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Rem-
edy in Need of Reform, 51 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 439, 441 (2009).
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But if one wanted to leave the statutory damages provisions largely
intact, three narrower revisions to the law could still be beneficial. First,
one could limit or eliminate statutory damages for private acts of display
or performance, making it more palatable to render someone who reads a
stolen, physical book open to the same liability currently faced by those
who read infringing e-books. Second, section 507 of the Copyright Act,63
which places a time limit on when suits for copyright infringement can
be brought, could be amended to allow an infringer to adversely possess
good title to a copy of a work that has been in one's possession for a
statutorily determined period of years following an illegal distribution.
Third, the law could take mens rea into account in cases of potentially
infringing acts of display or performance, by either severely limited dam-
ages or excepting from infringement private acts of display or perform-
ance that were undertaken with a good-faith belief that the activity was
not infringing.
IV. TRANSITION TO THE REVISED REGIME
A. Application to Existing Works
This Essay makes a proposal that can only be accomplished with
new legislation. But beyond convincing the legislature that eliminating
the reproduction right is the wisest way forward, the additional challenge
of how to transition from the existing regime to a new one must also be
addressed. One option would be for only newly created works to be af-
fected by the change. This is the easiest choice in terms of handling ret-
roactivity, but it is highly undesirable. Administratively, it would create
two parallel copyright regimes for well over a hundred years. Completely
different rules would apply to copyrighted works created before and after
the change, and the difference would be likely to sow confusion among
users, when a primary purpose of reform would be to create elegance and
clarity in the digital legal environment.
A far more preferable option would be to change the exclusive
rights retroactively, which would open up the federal government to
challenges under the takings clause for removing certain rights of copy-
right holders. Although fighting takings challenges would be an issue,
the Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence indicates that re-
vising copyright's exclusive rights need not create liability on the part of
the federal government. Assuming that intellectual property would be
afforded the same level of protection against eminent domain as real and
personal property,64 changes to the scope of intellectual property protec-
63 17 U.S.C. § 507 (1998).
64 See Home v. Dep't of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015) (stating that the Takings
Clause "protects 'private property' without any distinction between different types").
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tion would be properly characterized as a non-compensable regulatory
taking. "[T]he government's power to redefine the range of interests in-
cluded in the ownership of property [is] necessarily constrained by con-
stitutional limits."' 65 Resultingly, regulations that "go too far" will result
in a compensable taking.6 6 There is no set formula to determine when a
regulation goes "too far," although the Supreme Court has categorically
found regulations compensable as takings when they involve physical
invasions of property or when they remove all economic value from a
piece of land.67 Notably, the proposed revisions to the copyright statute
both take away and grant rights. While the reproduction right is elimi-
nated, rights to perform and display a work privately are created. The
goal of the regulation is to preserve the value of a copyright, not to di-
minish it. As Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council observed, "the
distinction between regulation that 'prevents harmful use' and that which
'confers benefits' is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objec-
tive, value-free basis."'68 In a case such as this, where the value of title in
a copyright quite possibly remains the same, it is most appropriate to
view a change in the law as a non-compensable regulatory taking. Be-
cause the change in the constellation of exclusive rights need not create
government liability to current copyright holders, it would be possible to
make the proposed changes, both prospectively and retroactively.
B. International Agreements
Enacting material reforms to copyright and other intellectual prop-
erty laws has the potential to create conflicts with international intellec-
tual property agreements that the United States has acceded to. For some,
these conflicts present no philosophical problem: if an international
agreement has become antiquated or no longer serves American interests,
there should be no hesitation to leave it and try to re-negotiate an im-
provement. For many others, the issue is thornier. The United States has
had a major role in negotiating international intellectual property agree-
ments-leaving them after having cajoled others to accede to them is
politically challenging, to state the issue mildly.
6 9
Eliminating the reproduction right presents particularly clear chal-
lenges for continued compliance with the Berne convention. Article IX
65 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (citing Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922)).
66 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
67 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
68 Id. at 1026.
69 See Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law
Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S.C. L. RaV. 977, 985-87, 1034 (2014) (describing the
United States's role in negotiating trade agreements and the difficulty of withdrawing from
them).
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provides, "(1) Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this
Convention shall have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction
of these works, in any manner or form."'70 The following clause provides
an exception that gives nations some ability to maneuver within this re-
quirement: "(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the
Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases,
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploita-
tion of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate inter-
ests of the author. '71 The specification of "special cases" would suggest
that the convention authors were contemplating measures like fair use
and other exceptions. However, one could argue that the advent of digital
copies ought to qualify as "special," given how far they are in nature
from copies as understood at the time of the treaty's enactment. More
importantly, the second part of the clause suggests a spirit of the Article
that the proposed change would preserve-"provided that such reproduc-
tion does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and does
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. 72 The
goal of the revision is not to make copyrighted works more difficult for
creators to exploit, but to preserve the ability to exploit and control
works while eliminating the confusion, absurdity, and counterintuitive
developments in digital copyright law.
But certainly, it is more palatable to call this situation as it is. As
with the 1976 Act, the Berne Convention was adopted before digital con-
tent was omnipresent. And like our national reproduction right, the repro-
duction right as conceived in the convention now produces absurd and
unintuitive results in a digital environment. The United States and other
nations should endeavor to find a politically feasible way to revisit the
issue.
CONCLUSION
When people legally acquire digital content, they have certain intui-
tive expectations about how it can be used. It's not uncommon to hear
someone say, "I paid for it, I can use it how I want to." Although expec-
tations are mutable and need not necessarily correspond to legal rights,
law is and is seen as more legitimate when it makes internal, logical
sense, when it corresponds to intuitions, and when the reasons for laws
can be articulated. Digital copyright law has failed to correspond to ex-
pectations and reason, and understandably-so long as the reproduction
right is central to copyright jurisprudence, it is nearly impossible to con-





ceive of how to shape the law to be elegant, intuitive, reasonable, and
sufficiently protective.
In a different context, James Grimmelmann has remarked that "the
wheels are coming off the bus of copyright law's conceptual frame-
work."'73 In these circumstances, the only sensible solution is to change
the framework. The reproduction right-once a useful tool for preserving
control over a work and internalizing its value-has ceased to be useful
in the digital age. We are left with a surprising but necessary conclusion.
In order for copyright to be saved, the copy right must be eliminated.
73 James Grimmelmann, Copyright Arbitrage in Action, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.conmprawfsblawg/2012/02/copyright-arbitrage-in-actiofn.htm].
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